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THE MYTH OF STATE 
INTERVENTION IN THE FAMILY 
Frances E. Olsen* 
Most people concede that there are times when state officials 
should intervene in the private family. Doctrines of family pri-
vacy are no longer thought to justify societal neglect of beaten 
wives or abused children. Yet society continues to use the ideal 
of the private family to orient policy. It seems important there-
fore to examine the concept of state intervention in the private 
family. In this essay, I argue that the private family is an inco-
herent ideal and that the rhetoric of nonintervention is more 
harmful than helpful. 
Although most people accept in general the assertion that the 
state should not intervene in the family, they qualify the asser-
tion with the caveat that the state should sometimes intervene 
in order to correct inequality or prevent abuse. I refer to this 
widely-accepted caveat as the "protective intervention argu-
ment" against nonintervention in the family. 
This essay presents a different argument against the policy of 
nonintervention in the family. It suggests that the terms "inter-
vention" and "nonintervention" are largely meaningless. The 
terms do not accurately describe any set of policies, and as gen-
eral principles, "intervention" and "nonintervention" are inde-
terminate. I ref er to this argument as the "incoherence 
argument." 
A useful comparison can be drawn between arguments against 
a policy of nonintervention in the private family and arguments 
against a policy of nonintervention in the free market. 1 The pol-
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1. I originally drew this comparison in Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study 
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
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icy of nonintervention in the free market, often referred to as 
laissez faire, was pursued by many American courts in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The group of scholars 
known as legal realists played an important role in discrediting 
the legal theories that supported laissez faire. Their arguments 
form a useful contrast and resource for the arguments I present 
in this essay. 
The protective intervention argument applies in a similar 
manner to both laissez faire and nonintervention in the family: 
whenever either the market or the family misfunctions, the state 
should intervene to correct inequality and protect the defense-
less. The most common and easily accepted argument against 
laissez faire is that the free market sometimes breaks down or 
works to the serious disadvantage of particular individuals or 
groups; state intervention is then necessary to protect the inter-
ests of the weaker economic actors and of society in general. 
This parallels the protective intervention argument regarding 
the family. Sometimes the family misfunctions; instead of being 
a haven that protects and nurtures family members, the family 
may become a center of oppression and exploitation.2 When this 
happens the state should step in to prevent abuse and to protect 
the rights of the individual family members. Both the market 
version and the family version of this protective intervention ar-
gument presuppose that it would be possible for the state to re-
main neutral, but present reasons that the state should not do 
so. 
The incoherence argument against nonintervention in the 
family parallels the legal realists' argument against laissez faire. 
Both laissez faire and nonintervention in the family are false 
ideals. As long as a state exists and enforces any laws at all, it 
makes political choices. The state cannot be neutral or remain 
uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do so. The 
staunchest supporters of laissez faire always insisted that the 
state protect their property interests and that courts enforce 
contracts and adjudicate torts. 3 They took this state action for 
granted and chose not to consider such protection a form of 
state intervention. Yet the so-called "free market" does not 
function except for such laws; the free market could not exist 
independently of the state. The enforcement of property, tort, 
and contract law requires constant political choices that may 
2. See Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 948-50 (1985). 
3. See Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 561-62 (1933). 
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benefit one economic actor, usually at the expense of another. As 
Robert Hale pointed out more than a half century ago, these le-
gal decisions "are bound to affect the distribution of income and 
the direction of economic activities. "4 Any choice the courts 
make will affect the market, and there is seldom any meaningful 
way to label one choice intervention and the other laissez faire. 
When the state enforces any of these laws it must make political 
decisions that affect society. 
Similarly, the staunchest opponents of state intervention in 
the family will insist that the state reinforce parents' authority 
over their children. Familiar examples of this reinforcement in-
clude state officials returning runaway children and courts or-
dering incorrigible children to obey their parents or face incar-
ceration in juvenile facilities. These state actions are not only 
widely supported, they are generally not considered state inter-
vention in the family. Another category of state policies is even 
less likely to be thought of as intervention. Supporters of nonin-
tervention insist that the state protect families from third-party 
interference. Imagine their reaction if the state stood idly by 
while doctors performed non-emergency surgery without the 
knowledge or permission of a ten-year-old patient's parents, or if 
neighbors prepared to take the child on their vacation against 
the wishes of the parents, or if the child decided to go live with 
his fourth grade teacher. Once the state undertakes to prevent 
such third-party action, the state must make numerous policy 
choices, such as what human grouping constitutes a family and 
what happens if parents disagree. These choices are bound to 
affect the decisions people make about forming families, the dis-
tribution of power within the family, and the assignment of 
tasks and roles among family members. The state is responsible 
for the background rules that affect people's domestic behaviors. 
Because the state is deeply implicated in the formation and 
functioning of families, it is nonsense to talk about whether the 
state does or does not intervene in the family. Neither "inter-
vention" nor "nonintervention" is an accurate description of any 
particular set of policies, and the terms obscure rather than clar-
ify the policy choices that society makes. 
4. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. 
Q. 470 (1923). See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1748-49 (1976). 
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I. THE PROTECTIVE INTERVENTION ARGUMENT 
To understand the incoherence argument, it is useful to ex-
amine in more detail the protective intervention argument-the 
argument that nonintervention would be possible but is not al-
ways a good idea. The protective intervention argument is an 
argument in favor of selective intervention.11 In exceptional situ-
ations, the state should intervene in the family to protect the 
interests of society and of the family members who may be at 
risk; aside from such exceptional situations, state intervention 
should ordinarily be limited to routine matters such as setting 
formal requirements for marriage licenses and providing public 
schooling for children. 6 
According to the usual version of the protective intervention 
argument, state intervention beyond routine matters should be 
carefully limited. Excessive or unnecessary intervention jeopar-
dizes people's freedom and interferes with family intimacy. Be-
cause of the risks inherent in state intervention, say proponents 
of protective intervention, safeguards should be devised to pro-
tect against government abuse and to prevent unnecessary e21..-
pansion of state intervention. As long as proper safeguards exist, 
however, state intervention can be useful-an important force 
for good. · 
5. The protective intervention argument presupposes that the concept of state inter-
vention in the family is coherent and meaningful. I argue that the concept is instead 
incoherent and meaningless. 
First, it makes no logical sense to consider the policies referred to as "noninterven-
tion" any less interventionist than many policies referred to as "intervention." By and 
large, policies supporting the status quo are referred to as nonintervention and attempts 
to change the status quo are called intervention; "intervention" and "nonintervention" 
are inappropriate and misleading terms to use to characterize these policies. Moreover, 
the policies referred to as "intervention" and "nonintervention" have a wide range of 
overlap; the same policy will be referred to as intervention by some and nonintervention 
by others. There is no objective or rational basis upon which to determine who is correct, 
because there is no logical basis for considering any particular set of policies 
nonintervention. 
The protective intervention argument, however, presupposes that there is a basis for 
distinguishing intervention from nonintervention and that the terms have meaning. In 
my discussion of the protective intervention argument, I find it convenient occasionally 
to use the term "intervention" as though it had meaning. When I use the term, I intend 
for it to convey the range of contradictory meanings that people assign in everyday use 
of language. 
6. As I argue infra, pp. 848-54, these "routine" matters can have an important influ-
ence on family roles and power relations within the family. 
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The argument in favor of selective state intervention is based 
on the notion that although families ought to be safe, support-
ive, and loving, some families at some times are not. 7 The family 
is supposed to be a warm, nurturant enclave governed by an 
ethic of altruism and caring-a haven protecting its members 
from the dangers of an authoritarian state and from the anar-
chistic intrusions of private third parties. Proponents of protec-
tive intervention recognize that in some unfortunate situations, 
the family can cease to be a haven and become instead, "a 
center of oppression, raw will and authority, violence and brutal-
ity, where the powerful economically and sexually subordinate 
and exploit the powerless. "8 
B. State Protection of Individuals 
When a family malfunctions it may be important for the state 
to protect an individual from the private oppression that mem-
bers of families sometimes inflict on each other. The protective 
intervention argument justifies state intervention in the family 
to protect children from abuse or serious neglect. State officials 
can remove children from their families if the children have 
been physically or sexually abused. In cases of child neglect, the 
state may send social workers into the children's homes or re-
move the children, temporarily or permanently, for their protec-
tion. Such state protection can include ordering medical care, 
even against the parents' religious scruples. These policies are 
generally considered to be a form of state intervention in the 
family, but accepted as intervention that is justified, indeed 
necessary. 
Until recent years, state protection for battered wives was also 
considered state intervention in the family-again, perhaps jus-
tified intervention, but intervention nonetheless. The protective 
intervention argument characterizes such state protection as a 
7. A more radical strand of criticism might argue that the nuclear family is a seething 
hothouse or an oppressive structure that will often become destructive of individual 
members. 
8. Minow, supra note 2, at 948. Professor Gerald Frug describes the city similarly as 
an enclave protecting individual freedom or alternatively a threat jeopardizing individual 
freedom. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1121 (1980). He 
suggests that "any form of group power intermediate bP.tween a centralized state and the 
individual" may have a precarious existence in a liberal political state. See id. 
840 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
beneficial and necessary form of intervention into a family that 
has problems. Few people today would openly oppose state en-
forcement of rape and battery laws against spouses.9 If providing 
shelter houses and legal aid to battered wives constitutes state 
intervention, many argue that such intervention is fully justified 
to protect individual wives from being oppressed by their hus-
bands. In the exceptional cases in which families misfunction, 
the state should step in to protect the powerless. 
This protective intervention argument begins to blend into 
the incoherence argument when people dispute whether such 
protection should be considered intervention at all. Some people 
would assert that when the family relationship has broken down, 
so has any justifiable claim to family privacy, and that state pro-
tection of the individual no longer constitutes intervention into 
the family. Indeed, proponents of this view might argue that it 
would be state intervention to try to keep the family to-
gether-for example, not to allow estranged spouses to get a di-
vorce. In such arguments, the idea that the privacy of the family 
unit should be protected from state intervention begins to be 
replaced by the notion that what merits protection is the privacy 
of the individual regarding sexuality, procreation, and the for-
mation of intimate, family-like relationships.10 I consider this 
9. People struggling to eliminate the marriage exemption from rape laws tell me, 
however, that they find a great many people who do oppose the enforcement of rape laws 
against husbands. The National Clearinghouse on Marital Rape sent me a packet of 
newspaper clippings from all over the country that are filled with amazing quotations 
from state legislators. Opposition to marital rape laws range from assertions that "sex is 
part of the [marriage] contract," Tex. Rep. Patricia Hill, quoted in the Times-Herald, 
May 21, 1985 (Dallas, Tex.), and "I don't know how you can have a sexual act and call it 
forcible rape in a marriage situation," Alaska Sen. Paul Fischer, quoted in Daily News, 
Mar. 21, 1985 (Juneau, Alaska), to concerns with false charges and "blackmail." Legisla-
tors argue that the "state shouldn't be going behind the bedroom doors." Tex. Rep. Pa-
tricia Hill, quoted in Times-Herald, supra. See also S.D. Rep. Joe Barnett, reported in 
Argus Leader, Mar. 2, 1985 (Sioux Falls, S.D.) (keep government out of the bedroom). 
Spousal rape laws are "an absolute intrusion into family life," S.D. Sen. Thomas Ruby, 
quoted in Capital Journal, Mar. 15, 1985, (Pierre, S.D.). They would pit family members 
against one another, S.D. Rep. Bernie Christenson, reported in Capital Journal, Feb. 14, 
1985 (Pierre, S.D.) and "erode at family life," S.D. Sen. Harold Halverson, quoted in 
Argus Leader, Feb. 28, 1985 (Sioux Falls, S.D.). "I still believe in the old traditional bond 
of marriage." Alaska Sen. Paul Fischer, quoted in Daily News, supra (copies of all clip-
pings on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
10. This shift from the concept of a private family into which the state should not 
intervene to the concept of individual privacy regarding intimate relationships corre-
sponds to a more general shift I have referred to as the "liberalization of the family." See 
Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY 1, 6-8 (1984). There I discuss 
the shift that has taken place from seeing the family as an organic group to seeing it as a 
contract among individuals. See id. at 11-12. 
For an argument that this individual privacy right should be grounded in individual 
autonomy and not in marriage and family, see Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based 
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concept of individual privacy to be part of the protective inter-
vention argument-that state intervention is sometimes justi-
fied-because although the privacy argument redefines state in-
tervention, it still considers intervention and nonintervention 
coherent, meaningful concepts. 
C. Safeguards Against Excessive Intervention 
The protective intervention argument usually treats noninter-
vention as the norm and intervention as an exception. 11 As one 
jurist put it: "The normal behavior of husband and wife or par-
ents and children towards each other is beyond the law-as long 
as the family is 'healthy.' The law comes in when things go 
wrong."12 
People who support selective state intervention often assert 
that safeguards are necessary to protect families from excessive 
state intervention-attempts by the state to offer protection 
when it is not really necessary. Child abuse and neglect statutes 
typically provide that until behaviors pass some threshold, the 
family is to remain private and the state should not intrude. The 
Constitution has been held to supply additional protection to 
family privacy by requiring a clear and convincing showing of 
abuse or neglect before parental rights may be severed.13 Physi-
cal or sexual abuse or serious neglect is usually necessary to trig-
ger state intervention. This possibility of state interyention, 
even if it actually occurs only in rare exceptional cases, can play 
a significant role in keeping family behavior within reasonable 
bounds of decency. 14 
Divorce or legal separation may also be considered a sufficient 
trigger to justify state intervention that would otherwise not be 
allowed. For example, many people who would oppose such poli-
cies in an ongoing family believe that if parents separate, the 
Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979). 
11. A more radical version of the protective intervention argument might maintain 
that state intervention is frequently or always necessary to protect individuals from the 
inherent oppressiveness of the nuclear family. See supra note 7. 
12. Kahn-Freund, Editorial Foreword to J. EEKELAAR, FAMILY SECURITY AND FAMILY 
BREAKDOWN at 7 (1971), quoted in Freeman, Violence Against Women: Does the Legal 
System Provide Solutions or Itself Constitute the Problem?, 3 CAN. J.F.L. 377, 387 
(1980). 
13. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982). 
14. The possibility of state action in more extreme cases can have a significant influ-
ence on everyday behavior within the family. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 2, at 952-53. 
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state should order the noncustodial parent to provide financial 
support for his or her child in case the parent would not do so 
without a court order.16 As long as they see safeguards, such as 
thresholds of family misbehavior or breakdown, to protect 
against excessive intervention, most people today support a cer-
tain level of protective intervention by the state. 
II. THE INCOHERENCE ARGUMENT 
The incoherence argument goes further and I believe is more 
fundamental than the protective intervention argument. The 
protective intervention argument treats nonintervention as a 
fully possible but sometimes unwise choice; the incoherence ar-
gument questions the basic coherence of the concepts interven-
tion and nonintervention. The state defines the family and sets 
roles within the family; it is meaningless to talk about interven-
tion or nonintervention, because the state constantly defines and 
redefines the family and adjusts and readjusts family roles. Non-
intervention is a false ideal because it has no coherent meaning. 
For example, suppose a good-natured, intelligent sovereign 
were to ascend the throne with a commitment to end state inter-
vention in the family. Rather than being obvious, the policies 
she should pursue would be hopelessly ambiguous. Is she inter-
vening if she makes divorces difficult, or intervening if she 
makes them easy? Does it constitute intervention or noninter-
vention to grant divorce at all? If a child runs away from her 
parents to go live with her aunt, would nonintervention require 
the sovereign to grant or to deny the parents' request for legal 
assistance to reclaim their child? Because complete agreement 
on family roles does not exist, and because these roles undergo 
change over time, the state cannot be said simply to ratify pre-
existing family roles. The state is continuously affecting the fam-
ily by influencing the distribution of power among individuals. 
The incoherence argument is more complex with regard to the 
family than with regard to the market. Because nonintervention 
in the family has been understood as a variety of things, demon-
15. Compare, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (order-
ing divorced father to pay for daughter's college education) with Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 
188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971) (refusing to order father to support daugh-
ter's college education). In McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) the 
court refused to order spousal support for the wife in an ongoing marriage, although the 
circumstances of the parties were such that the court might well have awarded spousal 
support had there been a legal separation. 
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strating its incoherence becomes more complicated than demon-
strating that laissez faire is incoherent with respect to the mar-
ket. Laissez faire is incoherent because no apolitical or neutral 
way exists to enforce property, contract, or tort law; once the 
state undertakes to enforce any of these laws, courts are forced 
to make political choices that cannot help but have important 
effects on the market and on the direction of economic activities. 
The alternative of not enforcing any property, contract, and tort 
law-creating a "state of nature" -is unacceptable in the mar-
ketplace. Once one rules out a state of nature, the government 
can no longer keep "hands off" the market; the question be-
comes simply which particular policies the government shall 
support. 
The greater complexity of the incoherence argument with re-
spect to the family than with respect to the market makes it 
initially easier to see that the state is not a neutral arbiter when 
it deals with the family. Historically, the state bolstered the 
power of the father over his family. A policy-based refusal to 
bolster this power might well be considered "interven-
tion"-whether justified under the protective intervention argu-
ment or considered obtrusive and unjustified. 16 Even today the 
state is often expected to enforce parents' authority over their 
children. To many who endorse hierarchical family relations, 
"nonintervention" seems to mean simply state support for the 
family member with power. "Nonintervention" loses much of its 
appeal if one thinks of it as mere reinforcement of the status 
quo. Moreover, because the. status quo undergoes continual 
change, nonintervention in the hierarchical family cannot be co-
herent. Even if state officials attempted simply to support the 
status quo they would still be forced to make political choices 
that have important effects on the distribution of roles and 
power within a family. 
In recent years, the state has been expected to treat the mem-
bers of the family-especially the husband and wife-more as 
equals. With increasing juridical equality within the family, the 
parallel between laissez faire with respect to the market and 
nonintervention with respect to the family becomes closer. Com-
plete juridical equality would require a new concept of state in-
tervention and nonintervention. At least two radically different 
concepts are possible, though neither would be acceptable to 
most people and, as I will demonstrate, neither is coherent. One 
possibility, which I refer to as the Market Model, is based on 
16; See infra p. 850. 
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enforcement of all laws, just as they are enforced in the market. 
Under this model, all rights and obligations would be enforced 
between family members the same way laws are enforced be-
tween strangers. In this manner the state could avoid direct sup-
port for family hierarchy. Nonintervention under the Market 
Model would be incoherent for the same reasons laissez faire is 
incoherent: enforcement of any property, tort, or contract law, 
whether between family members or strangers, requires political 
choices that necessarily affect the power of the individuals and 
groups involved and the direction of both their intimate and 
their commercial relations. 
A second possible model of state "nonintervention" in a jurid-
ically equal family is non-enforcement or delegalization-no 
rights or obligations to be enforced between family members. I 
refer to this construct as the State of Nature Model. Unlike the 
situation regarding the market, 17 something approaching this 
model is acceptable to many as a form of "nonintervention" in 
the family. It can be demonstrated, however, that noninterven-
tion under the State of Nature Model is also incoherent. First, 
because the "state of nature" would exist only within the family, 
the state would have to decide the boundaries of family. In addi-
tion, if the state of nature within the family were partial instead 
of complete, the state would have to decide which rights and 
obligations it would enforce within the family. These decisions 
require political choices that necessarily affect the roles and 
power within a family. Once the state undertakes to enforce 
some but not all rights and obligations, the state cannot avoid 
policy choices that will affect family life. No logical basis exists 
for identifying these state choices as either intervention or 
nonintervention. 
A. Introduction: Laissez Faire and Nonintervention 
As I have suggested, the incoherence argument against nonin-
tervention in the family is both simpler and more complex than 
the corresponding argument against laissez faire in the market. 
An important claim of laissez faire was that the state could and 
should treat market actors as juridical equals and enforce even-
handedly uncontroversial neutral ground rules that would en-
17. In the market, virtually no one would find a state of nature acceptable. People 
insist that some form of tort, contract, and property law be enforced. See supra p. 836. 
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sure the protection of all. 18 The incoherence argument against 
laissez faire demonstrated that the ground rules were not and 
could not be made neutral and that they could not be enforced 
even-handedly. Opponents of laissez faire showed that policy is-
sues arose constantly within every aspect of tort and contract 
law doctrine-that the kind of apolitical legal system that laissez 
faire envisioned and depended upon was a myth. 19 
In the case of the market, laissez faire seemed at least to pro-
duce a kind of state neutrality, because courts treated people as 
juridical equals. Workers and bosses were said to have identical 
rights to freedom of contract.20 Legal formalism or conceptual-
ism presupposed that it was possible for a legal system to be 
rational, objective, and principled-scientific rather than politi-
cal. The failure of legal formalism or conceptualism rendered 
laissez faire incoherent. 21 Had it really been true that law could 
be apolitical, that contract law could simply enforce the will of 
the parties, and tort law simply require those at fault to com-
pensate their victims, laissez faire might well have been coher-
ent. 22 No one has come up with any plausible method for remov-
ing the need for political choice from law, however, and I 
consider it highly unlikely that any such method exists or could 
be devised. 23 
B. Nonintervention and the Hierarchical Family 
The notion of nonintervention in the family is in a sense less 
plausible than laissez faire in the market. The ideal laissez-faire 
state would treat market actors as juridical equals; the state 
does not treat members of a family as juridical equals. Further, 
18. I refer to laissez faire in the past tense because I am speaking of its classical form, 
which came to seem implausible many years ago. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1746-48. 
19. See id. at 1748-49. 
20. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-58 (1905). 
21. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1731-32. 
22. Under these circumstances, the incoherence argument would fall, and the impor-
tant question would be the one raised by the protective intervention argument-whether 
the free market led to injustice and needless suffering in particular cases that could 
properly be relieved through selective state intervention. 
23. My agnosticism regarding the possible existence of an apolitical jurisprudence is 
based primarily on the difficulty of proving a negative. It is relatively easy to show that 
particular attempts to ground judicial decision-making on apolitical bases fail-for ex-
ample, that the law-and-economics field does not offer such a basis, see Horwitz, Law 
and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980) (arguing that law-
and-economics claims to present such an apolitical basis but cannot)-but it would be 
very difficult to prove that all possible attempts are bound to fail. 
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the constitutive role of law in creating the market is less obvious 
than law's constitutive role in creating and defining the family. 
Laws establish who is married to whom and who shall be consid-
ered the child of whom. 
The existence of this "legal-positivist" view of the family 
should not, however, obscure the coexisting and competing "nat-
ural law" belief that the family exists as a natural human forma-
tion, not created but merely recognized (or not recognized) by 
the state. Such a notion is implicit in the sense shared by most 
of us that some families exist that are not legally recognized. In 
fact, a great deal of family law doctrine can be seen as a re-
sponse to the problems caused by the disjunction between le-
gally recognized or de jure families and "natural" or de facto 
families-the gap between the legal definition of family and the 
sense people have of what a family really is.2 " 
Although the state defines and reinforces specific roles and a 
particular hierarchy within the family, these policies are often 
considered nonintervention; indeed, a refusal to bolster family 
hierarchy has sometimes been considered state intervention in 
the family. 211 The idea that the state can intervene or not inter-
vene in the family, and particularly that the state practices a 
policy of nonintervention when it bolsters family hierarchy, 
would seem to depend upon the belief that a natural family ex-
ists separate from legal regulations, and that the hierarchy the 
state enforces is a natural hierarchy, created by God or by na-
ture, not by law.26 
24. Common law marriage, putative marriage, and a variety of presumptions that le-
gitimate bigamous second or third marriages all serve to enable courts to treat estab-
lished (real) families like legal families. See also, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651-52 (1972) (invalidating state law denying unwed father legal rights of parent); Glona 
v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (limiting state's discretion 
to base wrongful death law on legal rather than biological relationships). 
25. See infra p. 850. 
26. In response, it might be argued that the state can adopt a meaningful policy of 
"nonintervention" even towards a "family" that it plays the major part in defining. Pro-
ponents of this view might acknowledge that their policy of selective nonintervention 
departs from the literal meaning of the term but assert that a distinction between the 
roles the state must play before the family can be legally recognized and other roles it 
might play lends coherence to their use of the term. On this view, the state pl!lYS one role 
as ground rule maker-policing the borders of the definition of "family" and protecting 
that family from intruding third parties. This role might be said to be sufficiently non-
controversial that it may be distinguished from numerous other roles-such as providing 
contraception or abortion-that the state may choose to avoid under a policy of 
''nonintervention." 
The standard and most obvious difficulty with this approach appears when one tries to 
select which functions are so "noncontroversial" that they come within the state's role as 
ground rule maker; and which functions are objectionable enough that the state should 
abjure them under its general policy of "nonintervention." While there may be some 
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1. The concept of a natural family- Last century the idea 
that wives were naturally dependent upon their husbands was 
believed by some people as firmly as the idea that children are 
naturally dependent upon their parents is believed now. The 
state was expected to bolster the husband's power over his wife 
whenever it was threatened. The husband chose the family dom-
icile and the wife was essentially forced to live there, just as chil-
dren are today. As expressed in a nineteenth-century treatise on 
domestic relations: "The domicile of the wife follows that of the 
husband; the domicile of the infant may be changed by the par-
ent. Thus does the law of domicile conform to the law of na-
ture. "27 Natural law or "Divine Providence" was thought to be 
the origin of our laws regarding the family. 28 "[P]ositive law but 
enforces the mandates of the law of nature, and develops rather 
than creates a system."29 Although there have been changes in 
what is considered natural within the family, the basic notion 
that family relations are natural relations has not changed that 
much. Today women may no longer be considered naturally de-
pendent on their husbands, but children are still considered nat-
urally dependent on their parents. 30 
A similar concept of a natural family finds expression in con-
stitutional law. At least since 1944, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a constitutionally-protected right of family privacy-a 
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."31 
functions-for example, requiring blood tests of marrying couples-that most would 
agree fit the first category, the great bulk of decisions will be objectionable to a number 
of putative "family" members. Given the inevitability of substantial disagreement over 
which family policies are neutral ground rules and which are objectionable intervention, 
labelling any such set of policies "nonintervention" robs the term of any sensible mean-
ing. These family policies in fact arise from politics and do not flow logically from neu-
tral principles. 
A second and more fundamental difficulty defeats the project of distinguishing the 
establishment of neutral ground rules from other state activities. Any ground rules that 
are sufficiently noncontroversial that they might plausibly be considered neutral would 
be too general to settle concrete disputes. Policies may well be internally consistent but 
still be indeterminate. No policies "flow logically" from principles, even if principles 
could be neutral. This argument j)arallels the arguments of some legal realists that lais-
sez faire was incoherent because the state could not enforce even-handedly uncontrover-
sial neutral ground rules. See supra pp. 844-45. 
27. J. ScHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 3, at 9 (5th 
ed. 1895). The author later criticizes as "judicial interference" the policy of some courts 
to relieve the wife of her obligation to follow her husband where his choice of domicile is 
unreasonable. See id. § 38, at 69. 
28. See id. § 3, at 8. 
29. Id. § 2, at 5. 
30. See infra pp. 851-52 & note 46. 
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The right to family privacy is 
often traced back to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of 
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The source of this family privacy has recently been said to be 
"not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights."32 The Supreme 
Court clearly envisions a concept of family relationship that is 
not dependent upon state law: "Nor has the [Constitution] re-
fused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a 
marriage ceremony."33 The family has its "origins entirely apart 
from the power of the State."34 Thus, for purposes of constitu-
tional adjudication, "[t]he legal status of families has never been 
regarded as controlling."311 The nineteenth century concept of a 
natural family has continued into the twentieth century. We 
now recognize law's important role in creating the nineteenth-
century family. I would hope we will not have to wait until the 
twenty-first century to recognize the constitutive role of law in 
the twentieth-century family. 
2. State enforced hierarchy: Not intervention?- Noninter-
vention would seem to have meaning against a backdrop of pre-
existing prescribed social roles within the family. State-created 
background rules shape and reinforce these social roles by as-
signing power and responsibility within the family. These back-
ground rules are not usually thought of as state intervention, but 
they implicate the state in the prescribed family roles and un-
dermine claims ·of nonintervention. The setting of the roles re-
quires political choices that can hardly be considered noninter-
vention. The state whose policy choices have had such a great 
effect upon these family roles certainly cannot be considered 
neutral, nor should the label "nonintervention" be used to con-
ceal or confuse the political nature of the choices society makes. 
Moreover, the enforcement of these family roles, which is 
what many people mean by "nonintervention," requires the 
state to make continual policy choices about the scope and 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Meyer invalidated a statute that forbade the teaching of any 
modern language other than English in the first eight grades, and Pierce overruled a law 
that required children to attend public schools. Both statutes were found to be unwar-
ranted intrusions into parents' liberty to raise their children. The cases were decided on 
the basis of the individual right to liberty, once granted substantive protection by the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Court has abandoned 
many of its substantive due process cases from the same period, it has reaffirmed Meyer 
and Pierce. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1157, 1161-63 (1980). 
32. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (footnote 
omitted). 
33. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). The Stanley Court was dealing with 
the biological father-child relationship, but it also emphasized Mr. Stanley's role in rais-
ing his children. 
34. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977). 
35. Id. at 845 n.52. 
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meaning of the roles it is enforcing. The content of family roles 
has changed over the years and there has never been complete 
agreement about the authority husbands and parents have over 
wives and children or about the responsibilities that go along 
with the authority. State officials must determine borderline 
questions about the nature and extent of family hierarchy on a 
case-by-case basis, and pursuing a policy of "nonintervention" 
cannot relieve state officials from having to make ad hoc politi-
cal decisions about the family. 
a. The Family Head Model: Direct empowerment of supe-
rior- Last century some people believed that by empowering 
the head of the family-the husband and father-to act for the 
family and to settle intrafamily disputes, the state could avoid 
intervening in the family. I refer to this policy as the Family 
Head Model. In theory, this model would relieve the state of 
making case-by-case decisions regarding the family. 
During the early nineteenth century, the husband was the ju-
ridical head of the family, entitled to control the wife and chil-
dren. He was also the financial head of the family. The common 
law, enforced by the state, provided that a wife's property be-
longed to her husband. Any personal property to which the wife 
held legal title was transferred automatically, by operation of 
law, to her husband; and the husband was given a life estate in 
her real property.36 He was entitled to the services of his wife 
and children. If they received wages, these wages belonged to 
him; even if they worked without pay, the father could recover 
the value of services they provided to third parties. 37 Although 
he could not legally sell the sexual services of his wife and minor 
36. This dramatic imposition was not considered state intervention. The transfer of 
the wife's property was sometimes characterized as a "gift," see J. ScHOULER, supra note 
27, § 80, at 132, but the wife had no choice about conferring it. Even if the couple agreed 
that the wife could keep her property, their contract would have been invalid. Compli-
cated rules applied to certain incorporeal interests of the wife. The husband's title to 
choses in action and certain real property interests was considered conditional and he 
would have to complete certain acts in order to appropriate the choses to himself or to 
carry out his right of reduction into possession. See id. §§ 80-159, at 131-248. 
37. See Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113 (1806) (ordering neighbors who had al-
lowed a teenager to live with them to pay her father wages for the value of the services 
she performed or might have performed for them). Probably the neighbors would not 
have resisted the father's claim and appealed the decision in his favor had it not been for 
the peculiar facts of the Benson case: Several years before, the father had abandoned his 
family and left them in "extreme poverty." Id. at 113. The neighbors found the daughter 
in a "very helpless condition," id., and took her into their home. Three years before he 
brought the lawsuit, the father had returned and made a similar demand of money from 
the neighbors, but community pressure forced him to compromise his claim. This history 
suggests that in the Benson case, the state was empowering the father and not just en-
forcing the agreed norms of society. 
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daughters, he could recover money from any man who had sex-
ual intercourse with them without his permission. 38 Some people 
objected to these policies, but there is no evidence that anyone 
considered the policies state intervention. 
Moreover, the nineteenth-century concept of nonintervention 
might require the state to bolster the authority of the father. If 
the wife were to leave and take the children with her, the courts 
would ordinarily be expected to grant a habeas corpus writ or-
dering her to return them to him. For courts to refuse to issue 
such a writ would be considered state intervention in the 
family. 39 
Today courts are less expected to bolster the power of the 
husband over the wife, but they are still expected to reinforce 
parents' authority over children. Many states have a procedure 
whereby courts can label a child "incorrigible" or "in need of 
supervision" and order the child to obey the parents or be 
locked up in the functional equivalent of jail.4° Parents also have 
considerable power over whether their child will be institutional-
ized as mentally defective or troubled.41 My point is not that 
such situations are very common, but that these state policies 
that empower parents are not considered state intervention in 
the family. 
In more subtle ways, also, the state directly authorizes parents 
to act on behalf of the child. The parents are empowered by the 
state, as well as by custom, to name the child and to change its 
name if they wish. They determine the state of which the child 
shall be a legal citizen. They enroll the child in school. These 
powers are established by state regulations, regulations that de-
fine family roles but are hardly noticed and certainly not consid-
ered state intervention. 
b. Creating economic dependence- The social interaction 
within a family can be significantly affected by the economic de-
pendence of wives on husbands and of children on parents. It is 
obvious to us today that laws and regulations in force early last 
century made the wife economically dependent upon the hus-
band, and an adolescent economically dependent on his father, 
38. The husband's action would be for "criminal conversation" if the man had inter-
course with his wife and for loss of services if with the daughter. Many commentators 
have considered this action for loss of the daughter's services to be a legal fiction that 
allowed the father to recover for his loss of honor or hurt feelings. 
39. See Olsen, supra note 1, at 1505 & n.30. 
40. See Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the 
Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1977-1978). 
41. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-04 (1979). 
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typically until age twenty-one. Neither married women nor mi-
nors could carry on a trade or business except under the author-
ity of the husband and father; their services belonged to him 
and he could collect any wages they might earn. Last century 
this dependency seemed natural to many people. 
Today the state's role in reinforcing economic dependency is 
less obvious but it is still significant. Although state laws no 
longer require women to perform unpaid work for their hus-
bands as part of the marriage contract, as in previous centuries, 
federal tax laws still provide a significant economic incentive for 
domestic labor to remain unpaid. 42 An additional basis for 
women's economic dependency is low pay; statistically, women's 
wages are only sixty-one percent of men's.43 Although state laws 
that in the past encouraged or required sex discrimination in 
employment have been preempted by federal antidiscrimination 
laws,44 a number of government agencies save many thousands 
of dollars by paying lower salaries for jobs held mainly by 
women than for jobs of comparable worth that .men perform. 411 
A child's economic dependence on her parent reinforces and 
increases the parent's power over the child. Although young chil-
dren might not be capable of independence,46 as children grow 
42. If a taxpayer pays to have housework done, the cost is generally not a tax deduc-
tion. If, however, he marries someone who keeps house for him, he can· file a joint return 
with her and they need not include as income the value of her housekeeping services. Or, 
suppose two taxpayers each did paid housework for the other. Their tax liabilities would 
be greater than if they each did their own housework. 
43. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY & NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN OF 
COLOR, WOMEN OF COLOR AND PAY EQUITY, reprinted in Women in the Workforce: Pay 
Equity: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 190, 198 
(1984). 
44. See Olsen, supra note 1, at 1548, 1555-59. 
45. A number of state governments have undertaken studies and have found that it 
would be very expensive to enact a program of "comparable worth." Thus they would 
seem to be reaping a significant economic benefit from taking advantage of women's 
lower pay. In AFSCME v. State of Washington, Nos. 84-3569, 84-3590 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 
1984) (available September 18, 1985 on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cases file), the Ninth 
Circuit struck down a District Court decision that would have required Washington 
State to make comparable worth payments. 
46. It is easy to assume that young children are naturally dependent on their parents. 
Upon closer examination, however, this assumption seems unjustified. Certainly, human 
offspring would appear to be as defenseless as other primate young, and in this sense can 
be said to be naturally dependent. But, in this sense, children would be naturally depen-
dent upon their mother, possibly on their father, and probably upon the larger commu-
nity. In many parts of the world a mother and infant or a mother, father, and infant 
could not survive alone. 
In civilized society, young children remain dependent. That this dependency is on the 
child's parents is surely based on laws. Laws ensure that most children remain with their 
parents, although in spite of the law, large numbers of children are separated from their 
parents. Presumably more children would be taken from their parents were it not for the 
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older, their dependence is increasingly attributable to state regu-
lations. Child labor laws, however wise as policy, are state regu-
lations that make it difficult for children to gain economic inde-
pendence. 47 And the state goes further. State laws not only limit 
a child's opportunity for paid employment, they also require her 
to attend school-work for which she receives no pay.48 Finally, 
when a state pays welfare benefits for a child or orders one par-
ent to pay support for a child, the money does not go to the 
child herself, but to a custodian, usually the other parent. This 
maintains the child's economic dependency on her custodian. If 
we are concerned about the state intervening in the family if it 
provides free contraceptives to girls without telling their par-
ents, we should not overlook the fact that state policies have 
made it difficult for girls to pay for contraceptives or to get them 
any other way.49 
c. Eliminating alternative sources of support or nur-
turance- Last century a woman was required to live in the 
home of her husband. He could choose to live anywhere, and she 
was obliged to follow him. One method of enforcing this require-
ment was to eliminate alternative living possibilities. Anyone 
who offered lodging to a runaway wife could be charged with 
harboring her. Although her father might, as a practical matter, 
get by with this infraction, it would be difficult for anyone else 
to do so. Most women would be unable to help her and most 
men ill-advised to do so.~0 If a runaway wife formed a close rela-
tionship with a man, they could be suspected of adultery and 
treated very harshly. If she actually had sexual relations with 
another man, she could be recaptured and forced home by her 
legal (as well as social) disapproval of kidnapping. 
Moreover, the period of dependency could be considerably shortened if, for example, 
property laws were not enforceable against children. One could have a society in which 
children were allowed to take whatever they needed and to eat food they found as freely 
as many children eat at home. My point is not that this plan would produce a better 
society or healthier children, but simply that it would be possible. 
47. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CooE §§ 1290-1311 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985); Youth Em-
ployment Standards Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 409.101-.124 (1979) (restricting and regu-
lating the hours and types of employment for minors). 
48. See, e.g. Compulsory Education Law, CAL. Eouc. CooE §§ 48200-48324 (West 
1978 & Supp. 1985); Michigan Compulsory School Attendance Law, MICH. CoMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 380.1561.-1599 (West 1979). Of course, it can be argued that school attendance is 
non-productive labor and should be considered a benefit rather than a burden. In some 
societies, however, being a student is considered gainful employment and people are paid 
to attend school. My point is simply that these state policies are not natural or inevitable 
and they implicate the state in the economic dependency of youngsters. 
49. See infra p: 860; Olsen, supra note 1, at 1506 & n.33. 
50. See J. SCHOULER, supra note 27, § 41, at 71-72. 
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husband. cH The husband could bring a civil suit and recover 
money damages from the man for "criminal conversation." The 
husband would continue to own his wife's property and to be 
entitled to her services, but he would no longer have to support 
her. In many cases he could take their children away from her 
and perhaps even bar her from visiting them. 112 
Today the state will ordinarily not penalize third parties who 
offer lodging or friendship to a woman without the permission of 
her husband, but laws continue to penalize those who offer the 
same to children without the permission of their parents. The 
state is implicated in the power and role distribution within the 
family when its laws prevent children from looking to third par-
ties for support. Yet the state is not accused of intervening in 
the family when it forces children to live with their parents or 
when it prohibits doctors from treating minors without the par-
ents' knowledge and approval. The child may be required to as-
sociate or forbidden from associating with people, at the whim of 
the parents. Statutes permitting courts to issue grandparent vis-
itation orders that may limit this parental prerogative in certain 
egregious cases are themselves sometimes criticized as state "in-
tervention" in the family. 113 The state gives parents considerable 
coercive power over children and then characterizes its refusal to 
monitor this power as "nonintervention." 
d. Limiting state protection- Last century the father was 
permitted to discipline his wife and children, and this permis-
sion often extended to corporal punishment. Behavior that 
would constitute a criminal offense if directed at a stranger was 
fully legal against one's children and mere grounds for separa-
tion or divorce if directed against one's spouse. Doctrines of in-
trafamily tort immunity protected the husband and father from 
civil suits by his beaten wife or children. 114 
51. See id. § 45, at 76. If a husband discovered his wife in bed with another man and 
killed them, his crime would be a misdemeanor, not a felony. See id. § 45, at 76, n.5. 
52. Lord Talfourd's Act, an 1839 reform bill in England that gave courts power to 
grant mothers child custody and visitation, specifically excluded from its provisions adul-
terous mothers; and some Lords who opposed the bill still argued that the risk that an 
adulterous mother could benefit from the reform if her adultery could not be proven was 
so unacceptable that the bill should be defeated. See 44 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 772, 789 
(1838). 
53. See, e.g., Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984). In some situations, 
grandparent visitation orders may coerce a child to continue unwanted contact with the 
grandparents. 
54. The same doctrine would, of course, protect the wife and child from civil suit if 
they were to assault or batter the husband and father, but usually it did not work that 
way. 
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Today, intrafamily tort immunity has been widely abolished, 
but a great deal of behavior that would be criminal or tortious 
between strangers may still be done with impunity within a fam-
ily. In many states, the husband may legally force sexual inter-
course upon his wife. In most states, spouse abuse is treated dif-
ferently from other forms of personal violence-sometimes 
better, often worse. Children are offered limited state protection 
against their parents. Usually, crimes and torts will be recog-
nized only if a child is badly abused; and even this occasional 
enforcement is often thought to constitute state interven-
tion-justified, but intervention nonetheless. In theory, parents 
can be prosecuted for homicide, sexual abuse, serious physical 
assaults, and child neglect. In practice, however, a child's depen-
dency is so extensive that many crimes, including assault and 
sexual abuse, often go unprosecuted. 
3. Changes in family hierarchy over time- The nature and 
degree of power that the state allows one family member to ex-
ercise over another has changed over time and is regularly con-
tested. Reforms that have claimed to provide for juridical equal-
ity between men and women have tended to modify the legal 
role expectations placed on husbands and wives. The role rela-
tionship between parent and child has also undergone considera-
ble change over time. Because parents' power over their children 
is incomplete; the state must adjudicate borderline cases and in 
doing so necessarily influences the family. At one extreme, state 
prosecution of a father for intentionally killing his child is uni-
versally approved and is unlikely to be considered state inter-
vention in the family; at the other extreme, charging a father 
with kidnapping for sending a child to her room as a form of 
punishment would strike most people as serious state interven-
tion in the family. Courts must frequently draw a line between 
protecting the individual family member and promoting family 
authority, and different courts would draw the line closer to one 
or the other of these extremes. Exactly where a court draws the 
line, or where it would be expected to draw the line, will affect 
power relations within the family. The choices that courts make 
will be based on policy considerations and the state cannot avoid 
making decisions that will influence family relations. 
Moreover, when parents disagree, the state has to decide 
which of the two to empower or to refuse to empower. This 
choice will in turn influence relations between the parents. Thus, 
what is frequently referred to as "nonintervention" involves an 
initial policy choice regarding family roles, followed by further 
policy choices regarding the details of those roles. 
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Because nonintervention is understood with reference to spe-
cific family roles and the state is expected to take these roles 
into account in settling disputes, courts must make one choice 
after another regarding the content and nature of these roles. As 
long as they do not ratify and enforce all assertions of authority 
by a husband or parent-for example, they prosecute in-
trafamily murder-courts must decide which behavior they will 
sanction and which they will not. These decisions require courts 
to take a stand on complex issues of intergenerational conflict 
and gender politics. The simple claim that the state should not 
intervene in the family tends to obscure the genuine problems of 
ethics and policy that continually arise. 
C. Nonintervention and the Egalitarian Family 
In theory it would be possible for the state to avoid taking a 
stand in favor of juridical hierarchy within the family. There are 
at least two ways the state could settle lawsuits involving fami-
lies that would avoid ratifying family hierarchy. One would be to 
treat the family as a miniature state of nature by refusing to 
enforce any lawsuits between family members; the other would 
be to treat marriage as nothing more than an express contract 
and parentage as irrelevant, a~d enforce all lawsuits between 
family members just as though the litigants were not related. A 
consideration of these two contrasting extremes will further il-
lustrate the difficulty with the concept of "nonintervention." 
1. State of Nature Model- The state might seem to be able 
to remain neutral among family members by steadfastly refusing 
to enforce any tort, contract, or criminal law between members 
of a family. This approach, if carried to the extreme, would cre-
ate a "state of nature" within the family, and could be said to 
take seriously the notion that families should work out their own 
problems. If a wife were being beaten, it would be up to her to 
deal with the problem; the state would not "intervene." If she 
dealt with the problem by shooting her husband, the state would 
be expected to continue its policy of "nonintervention." If a per-
son were indicted for murder, it would be a sufficient defense to 
prove that the defendant and the victim were members of the 
same family. The killing would then be considered a family mat-
ter into which the state should not intrude. 
As in any imagined state of nature, this approach would seem 
to benefit the stronger and prejudice the weaker members of a 
family. In fact, though, it might disempower the physically weak 
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less than the system that seems to operate in some communi-
ties-a system that treats intrafamily battery as private, but 
leaves homicide fully outlawed. Such a system is especially dis-
empowering to wives if spouse abuse is not recognized as a justi-
fication for or defense to homicide.1111 
The State of Nature Model would not really enable the state 
to remain neutral or uninvolved in the family. Even if the state 
of nature were complete within the family, the state would still 
have to decide who constituted a family and how to deal with 
lawsuits involving third parties and members of the family. Also, 
a complete state of nature would not fit contemporary views of 
nonintervention in the family. A partial state of nature within 
the family might be acceptable to many people; but if the state 
of nature were partial, decisions about what laws to enforce 
among family members would require additional political 
choices that would affect authority and roles within families. 
2. Market Model- A second way the state might seem to be 
neutral among family members is based on the opposite strategy 
of enforcement. The state could treat each member of a family 
as a juridical equal and treat their family status as irrelevant. 
Marriage and parentage would become private relationships, not 
recognized by the state. Courts would treat as irrelevant the fact 
that litigants were married to one another or that one was the 
parent of the other, and enforce lawsuits as between any unre-
lated people or strangers. This approach essentially ignores the 
family relationship and treats family members just as strangers 
are treated. Such a policy would not fit contemporary views of 
nonintervention in the family, especially as regards children. For 
example, under the Market Model, parents who disciplined their 
children by sending them to their rooms might be guilty of kid-
napping and the children could have a valid cause of action for 
false imprisonment. Parents would have neither an obligation to 
support children nor a right to keep them from living away from 
home. Children and parents would be free to cut their own 
deals. Contracts entered into between children and their par-
ents, or between any other family members, would be just as en-
forceable as contracts between any unrelated individuals. 
The concept of nonintervention based on the Market Model is 
not only unacceptable to most people, but it is also no more co-
herent than laissez faire. All the arguments put forth by the le-
gal realists to show the incoherence of laissez faire apply to non-
intervention under the Market Model. The neutrality of the 
55. See Olsen, supra note 1, at 1509. 
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Market Model would be formal neutrality only, even as between 
adults. The particular tort, contract, and criminal laws the state 
chose to create and enforce would affect the relative power of 
individuals and thus the bargains they could negotiate with their 
spouses, children, or other relatives. For example, strong battery 
laws are likely to help wives and children; weakened self-defense 
doctrines limit their ability to protect themselves, and would 
seem to help husbands.116 
To illustrate further, consider the laws that forbid prostitution 
and nullify contracts when sexual services constitute all or part 
of the consideration on one side of the agreement. In our present 
society, the effect of nullifying such contracts usually enriches 
the male at the expense of the female. 117 The public policy 
against prostitution might have something to do with refusing to 
reduce women to sex objects, but it might have as much or more 
to do with preserving for men the economic resources that rein-
56. Popular television programs have recently presented sympathetic portrayals of 
abused wives and children who, unable to enlist police protection against an abusive 
husband or father, killed their abuser. See, e.g., "The Burning Bed" (dramatized account 
of abused wife killing husband); "60 Minutes" (news special on boy who shot his abusive 
father). 
57. The case of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 
(1976), has been widely praised and blamed for the many things it held and refused to 
hold, but few if any commentators have paid attention to the court's insistence that a 
contract for sexual services is unenforceable. This seemingly neutral rule is likely in 
practice to hurt occasional unsophisticated women. Men, sophisticated or unsophistica-
ted, are likely to be benefited or left untouched. 
The anti-prostitution rule also limits the right to contract, and it limits it in a way 
more likely to hurt women than men. It is one thing to say that we will not assume that 
men necessarily get more out of sexual intercourse than women do, but it is quite an-
other thing to say that courts may not consider and couples may not contract about any 
differential benefit that may accrue. Given the statistics on present satisfaction with sex-
ual intercourse, I would suggest that this clearly harms women. See Leerhsen, Jackson & 
Bruno, Ann Landers and 'The Act,' NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1985, at 76 [hereinafter cited as 
Ann Landers) (reporting survey results that 72% of women were dissatisfied with sex as 
practiced). 
One criticism sometimes made of the Marvin case is that it invites courts to inquire 
into the intimate details of a couple's life. See, e.g., Chambers, The "Legalization" of the 
Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. M1cu. J.L. REF. 805 (1985). To 
make "whisperings across the pillows," id. at 825, sacred, private, and unrepeatable is to 
support the sexual status quo. Sex as currently practiced seems to be startlingly more 
satisfactory to men than to women. See Ann Landers, supra. Privatizing sex reduces 
discussion that might lead to change. Sex is private in part because the state makes it 
private and because keeping sex private seems to serve the interests of those with power. 
The taboo on inquiring into the quality of male-female relationships may be based more 
on a fear of exposing systematic inequality than on anything else. Child custody cases 
often involve inquiry into the quality of parent-child relationships. Although commenta-
tors may criticize courts' ability to judge intimate relationships, child custody cases do 
suggest that courts can examine intimate relationships without any devastating effects. 
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force their prestige and power.58 The result of policies that en-
rich men and impoverish women is that even if the law were to 
refuse to permit "family" def ens es to contract, tort, or criminal 
actions, wives would still often bring to the marriage a position 
lower in the social and economic hierarchy, and thus a weaker 
bargaining position vis-a-vis their husbands. 
Ill. THE EXPERIENCE OF STATE INTERVENTION 
The assertion I have made-that the concepts of state inter-
vention and nonintervention in the family are essentially mean-
ingless-might ring hollow to an impoverished mother struggling 
to keep the state from taking her children away from her. More 
tragically, my assertion could sound absurd or seem totally 
meaningless to many innocent children who live in fear of the 
juvenile authorities. Hundreds of youngsters, the quality of 
whose lives has already been diminished by poverty and neglect, 
have been forced into silence and concealment. The specter of 
state intervention in the family denies to many of them even the 
partial relief they might get from sharing their pain and humili-
ation with a friendly neighbor or sympathetic teacher. Many 
such children exist, and to them state intervention can seem real 
and frightening. 
There are many other examples of situations in which people 
experience themselves to be victims of state intervention. In the 
1960's a husband and wife in Connecticut were denied legal ac-
cess to contraceptives until they sued and appealed their case to 
the United States Supreme Court.119 Earlier in the century, Lillie 
and 0.B. Williams were prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation 
and sentenced to jail terms when state officials in North Caro-
lina decided to challenge the Nevada divorces they had obtained 
from their previous spouses. 60 They too took their case to the 
United States Supreme Court and won, only to lose on a retrial 
and second appeal. 61 To both these couples state intervention 
would seem to be a very real concern. 
State intervention may also have considerable meaning to the 
lover who, upon the death of his beloved, finds himself with no 
58. For an elaboration of these ideas, see F. Olsen, Prostitution: The Stigma of 
Money (Apr. 16, 1985) (transcript of talk given at UCLA Law School) (copy on file with 
u. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
59. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
60. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
61. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
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status, their jointly shared property snatched away by the be-
loved's long-estranged parents. The lover has no say about fu-
neral arrangements and cannot even attend services without the 
permission of the parents. Even if the couple drew up wills, the 
beloved's testament would once have been routinely set aside for 
presumed undue influence.62 
The parents, however, might well consider their family in-
truded upon if the state were to limit their rights for the sake of 
their child's lover. Lillie and O.B. Williams's first spouses may 
have resented the courts of Nevada intervening in their family 
affairs by granting divorces against them when, under their own 
state law, they had committed no wrong and would expect to 
have a right to remain married. 63 
The experience of state intervention in the family can involve 
either affirmative coercive behavior by state officials, such as 
physically forcing a child away from his or her parent, or a re-
fusal by state officials to come to the aid of one claiming a fam-
ily right, such as the state's failure to order foster parents to 
relinquish a child to her natural parent.64 From the child's per-
spective, the transfer of custody to natural parents the child 
barely knows would seem to be as serious intervention as it 
would be to take her away from a natural parent. 
The experience of intervention depends upon having some ex-
pectation disappointed or some sense of entitlement violated. 
Disappointment and violation are very real experiences. Unfor-
tunately, they cannot be avoided by a simple policy of noninter-
vention in the family. Moreover, disappointment and violation 
of hopes and dreams may be as distressing as the disappoint-
ment and violation of expectations and entitlements. It is not 
clear, in the example above, that the state should sacrifice the 
interests of a lover for the sake of the beloved's parents, just 
because the parents, under present law, have more settled ex-
pectations and entitlements. 
Because the notion of state intervention depends upon a con-
ception of proper family roles and these roles are open to dis-
pute, almost any policy may be experienced by someone as stat~ 
62. See In re Kaufman's Will, 20 A.D.2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), af/'d, 15 
N.Y.2d 825, 205 N.E.2d 864, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1965). See also Sherman, Undue Influ-
ence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PnT. L. REV. 225, 239-48 (1981) (asserting that 
homosexuals' wills are subjected to heightened scrutiny for undue influence). 
63. For a discussion of the difficulties with such conflicting rights, see Olsen, Statu-
tory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 'Tux. L. REV. 387 (1984). 
64. See Bennet v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976) 
(finding long period of separation from natural parent an extraordinary circumstance 
that can "trigger" the best interests of the child test). 
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intervention. In many situations, someone's expectations will be 
disappointed or sense of entitlement violated no matter what ac-
tion the state takes or refuses to take. One can often argue that 
in a particular case nonintervention really means whatever one 
wants the state to do; any policy one dislikes might be labeled 
intervention. 
For example, from one perspective, the state intervenes in the 
family when it provides contraceptives to minors. The "squeal 
rule" proposed by the Reagan administration, although not 
preventing the distribution of contraceptives, would have re-
quired that parents be notified that contraceptives had been 
given to their children.65 This was supposed to reduce state in-
tervention in the family and to enable parents to counsel their 
children about the problems of adolescent sex. Opponents feared 
it would deter the youngsters from obtaining contraceptives (but 
not from engaging in sex), and argued that this particular inter-
vention in the family was justified. 
From another perspective, the "squeal rule" does not reduce 
state intervention (whether for good or ill), but is itself a crude, 
abusive form of intervention. The state achieves a virtual mo-
nopoly on effective birth control by impoverishing young women 
and forbidding inexpensive over-the-counter sales of prescrip-
tion contraceptives. 66 It then proposes to use this monopoly to 
intrude into the parent-child relationship and pass along infor-
mation to the parents that the parents have neglected to obtain 
the old-fashioned way-by talking with their children. The state 
thus rewards neglectful parents and removes from them an in-
centive to maintain supportive communication with their chil-
dren. It encourages parents to neglect their child's sex education 
and to ignore the pressures put upon their child until after the 
child has become sexually active and the state so notifies them. 
65. See 48 Fed. Reg. 3600 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.5). See also 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, at E5, col. 4. The rule was found unlawful on statutory 
grounds. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). Some people have opposed the "squeal rule" on the grounds that certain fathers 
might demand sex from their daughters if they found out that the daughters were sexu-
ally active. Others fear fathers would respond with physical abuse of their daughters. 
66. The state's role seems even more intensive and insidious when we consider how 
reluctant state officials are to prosecute date rape. The state permits unsafe streets that 
limit a woman's choices: she may stay home (statistically, a remarkably dangerous loca-
tion for women), go out in a group of people, or go out with one man. Especially if she 
chooses the one-man option, the female may find herself faced with the further choice of 
consenting to sexual intercourse or being raped by him without recourse. Thus, women 
cannot really be said to have the option of refraining from sexual intercourse. Abstinence 
is not a reliable form of birth control for many women. 
SUMMER 1985] Myth of State Intervention 861 
Nonintervention arguments can be leveled against laws and 
regulations that refuse to treat unmarried couples enough like a 
family67 or against laws that treat them too much like a family.68 
Nonintervention arguments can be used to keep children from 
being put into foster care, to remove them from foster care, or to 
keep them from being removed from foster care.69 Noninterven-
tion arguments can even be leveled against a policy of enforcing 
contracts between unwed couples. 70 While one can sympathize 
with anyone who is disappointed by a state policy, it is hard to 
see that anything is actually gained by characterizing the cause 
of that disappointment as state intervention. 71 
IV. WHY IT MATTERS 
The protective intervention argument, that the state should 
intervene in the family when necesary, has gained so much ac-
ceptance-just as the protective intervention argument against 
laissez faire has gained widespread acceptance-that one might 
wonder why we need the incoherence argument, that interven-
tion and nonintervention are meaningless concepts. First, it is 
not the case that the exception has swallowed the rule. Under 
the protective intervention argument, the state is treated as hav-
ing a policing function-to detect and correct those rare circum-
stances that disturb and disrupt the family, without questioning 
any of the basic individualistic foundations of society. The asser-
tion that the state can and should avoid "intervention" in the 
family plays an important but generally unrecognized ideological 
role.72 Further, focusing on "nonintervention" tends to mush 
and confuse the ethical and political choices we make. It directs 
our attention to a false issue and obscures genuine issues of eth-
ics and policy. Finally, both laissez faire and nonintervention in 
67. See Chambers, supra note 57. 
68. See id.; Burt, Coercive Freedom: A Response to Professor Chambers, 18 U. M1cH. 
J.L. REF. 829 (1985). 
69. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (acknowledg-
ing, but refusing to accept, argument). 
70. See Burt, supra note 68. 
71. This is not to deny the ideological significance of the concern, however. To com-
plain that the hassling of your Jiving arrangement (whether through zoning laws, fornica-
tion laws, or any other law or regulation) constitutes state intervention in the family is 
an ideological claim, a claim of entitlement to live the way you choose. For example, 
successfully characterizing state laws against homosexual relations as state "interven-
tion" in the family tends to legitimate same-sex relationships. 
72. For an interesting discussion of the ideological role of family law, see Freeman, 
supra note 12, at 387-401. See also Olsen, supra note 10. 
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the family have sprung up in modern versions-law-and-eco-
nomics in place of laissez faire and the individual right to pri-
vacy in place of nonintervention in the family. These new forms, 
one labeled conservative, the other liberal, are flawed in the 
same way the originals-laissez faire and nonintervention-are 
flawed. The standard liberal criticism of law-and-economics and 
the standard conservative criticism of the right to privacy are 
both versions of the protective intervention argument. In each 
instance, I believe the incoherence argument presents a more 
important critique. 73 
73. In the case of privacy, liberals argue that the fundamental principle of individual 
privacy offers a rational justification or grounding for a great many policies-ranging 
from access to contraceptives to a disapproval of surveillance over sexual choices. Con-
servatives often respond by pitting public morality against individual privacy. This is 
parallel to the protective intervention argument regarding the family. The conservatives 
assume that privacy is a coherent concept and that the rational elaboration of this prin-
ciple would lead to the policies supported by the liberals. The argument of the conserva-
tives that public morality justifies limiting privacy is like the argument that the state 
should intervene in the private family to protect against abuse. 
The stronger and more important answer to the liberals' claim would be like the inco-
herence argument. Privacy is not a coherent concept and it does not lead to any indispu-
table policy choices. The state is implicated in privacy just as it is in family. Although I 
support many of the policies they advance in the name of "privacy," I believe the liberals 
are mistaken to think that they can ground or justify these policies on any rational or 
apolitical basis. 
In the case of law-and-economics, conservatives argue that the concept of efficiency 
offers a rational justification for a great many policies. In particular, law-and-economics 
purports to demonstrate that many economic policies supported by liberals simply fail 
objectively-they wil_l not produce the results the liberals hope to achieve. Liberals often 
respond by pitting equality, justice, or fairness against efficiency. This is parallel to the 
protective intervention argument against laissez faire policies toward the free market. 
Liberals often assume that efficiency is a coherent concept and that a relentless focus on 
efficiency would lead to the policies supported by the conservatives. 
The stronger and more important answer to the conservatives' claim would be like the 
incoherence argument against laissez faire. "Efficiency" is indeterminate and does not 
lead to the policy choices that conservatives claim it does. Liberals do not have to resort 
to arguments that pit other goals against efficiency, but can challenge the basic underly-
ing premises of conservative law-and-economics. See Kennedy, Distributive and Pater-
nalist Motives in Contract and Tort, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and 
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 563 (1982); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Kelman, Misunder-
standing Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of Law and Economics, 33 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 274 (1983); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideol-
ogy in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 
1979 Wis. L. REV. 769. See also Horwitz, supra note 23; Kennedy & Michelman, Are 
Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980). 
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State intervention in the family is an ideological, not an ana-
lytic concept. The incoherence argument demonstrates that 
neither intervention nor nonintervention has a coherent mean-
ing. The protective intervention argument, that the state should 
intervene in the family whenever necessary to defend the inter-
ests of society or of individual oppressed family members, does 
not go far enough. First, it presupposes that nonintervention is a 
possible choice; and second, it usually accepts nonintervention 
as a norm or as an ideal. 
The protective intervention argument misperceives the 
problems caused by unfortunate social policies. For example, the 
problem with state officials taking children away from poor par-
ents is not really a problem of state "intervention," but a prob-
lem of the substance of that state behavior. What the state does 
is sometimes so bad that people would rather it did noth-
ing-which of course is not possible. The effort to get the state 
to do nothing, even if it were possible, misfocuses attention. It is 
misguided to treat freedom as the polar opposite of state "inter-
vention" or of government regulation. As Morris Cohen noted in 
another context, real freedom depends upon opportunities sup-
plied by institutions that involve legal regulation. 74 The attempt 
to criticize state "intervention" instead of criticizing the particu-
lar policies pursued may be especially limiting for poor people, 
who often have to rely on various government programs and are 
thus less likely to benefit from any political strategy based on 
the myth of nonintervention. 76 
Sexual abuse of children provides an example of the inade-
quacy of the rhetoric of nonintervention. It also illustrates 
problems with the state giving adults so much authority and 
power over children.76 A child's failure to report sexual abuse 
74. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 591. 
75. Cf. MacKinnon, The Male Ideology of Privacy: A Feminist Perspective, 17 RADI-
CAL AMERICA, July-Aug. 1983, at 23, 32 (noting that abortion rights are particularly easy 
to deny to poor women because the right is based on privacy). 
76. The state establishes a situation of dependency and then allows as the only alter-
native a complete severing of the relationship. If you watch television ads for toilet paper 
and blue jeans, the puzzling question is not why incest is so widespread but rather that 
sexual abuse of children has any limits. If we make children totally dependent upon one 
or two adults and allow helplessness and dependency to be eroticized, we should not 
pretend surprise and outrage at child abuse. The state empowers adults and gives tax 
deductions for advertising that eroticizes domination. See generally J. Kilbourne, Killing 
Us Softly: Advertising's Image of Women (Cambridge Documentary Films, Inc. 1979) 
(film examining use of sex in advertising as reflective and partially constitutive of 
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may often be her best response to a bad situation. Incest de-
prives a child of autonomy and corrupts the protection the abus-
ing parent offers the child. And when abuse is discovered, in-
stead of empowering the child and making it possible for him or 
her to resist the adult, state officials tend to move in and take 
over-:-sometimes making matters worse. After revealing sexual 
abuse the child is all too likely to have even less autonomy and 
fewer options for dealing with his or her vulnerability and hurt. 
The child may be summarily denied the opportunity to maintain 
any relationship with the abusing adult, even if the child wants 
desperately to maintain a relationship. In cases of child abuse, 
including sexual abuse, state policy should end the abuse or em-
power the child to end it, not force the child to leave home.77 
If we think in terms of intervention versus nonintervention, 
and consider our options to be thus limited, we are less likely to 
devise effective alternatives. 78 As we become less preoccupied 
with the myth of state intervention, perhaps we can focus proper 
attention on the realities of people's lives. 
culture). 
77. How to empower children to end their abuse is a topic for another article. Most of 
us are not accustomed to thinking about ways to empower victims. For some early 
thoughts, see Olsen, supra note 63, at 407-09, 424, 431. It seems important to explore 
creative ways to improve the options available to children in difficult home situations. 
For example, modern technology might enable children to summon help quickly enough 
that it would be safe for them to stay with abusive parents to whom they are deeply 
attached. 
78. While this essay has focused on the family, its thesis is general. The state cannot 
be neutral, nor can it be a neutral arbiter of rights. See Olsen, supra note 63; Sympo-
sium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
